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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MARIANI, District Judge. 
Kenneth Britton appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 210 months’ imprisonment following 
his guilty plea to multiple conspiracy counts for his involvement in an interstate 
prostitution ring. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in this case, we will revisit them only briefly. Britton acted as a “pimp” in a 
prostitution ring, which occurred from February 2001 to December 2005, involved 
sixteen coconspirators and over 152 individuals, and spanned across several states. He 
sold the sexual services of young girls who often “had poor home lives, had dropped out 
of school, had been sexually abused, and had dismal hope for the future.” Sealed App. 6.  
One prostitute in the organization, Tana Adkins, carried the label of Britton’s 
“bottom bitch.” “Bottom bitches” are “prostitutes in charge of a pimp’s other prostitutes, 
responsible for the recruitment, training, collection of earnings, forwarding the earnings 
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to the pimp, and oversight of other prostitutes.” Id. In addition, “[w]hen called upon to do 
so, the ‘bottom bitch’ will defend her territory against other prostitutes and will attack 
‘renegades,’ that is, prostitutes who work without a pimp.” Id. As a result of her role in 
the prostitution ring, Adkins pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracy to 
engage in interstate prostitution pursuant to a 33-count Superseding Indictment issued by 
a federal grand jury on December 8, 2005. Id. at 3. 
The Superseding Indictment named fifteen other individuals involved in the 
prostitution conspiracy, including Britton. On March 1, 2006, Britton was again indicted 
and charged for acts occurring in 2002, including sex trafficking of minors and interstate 
transportation of a juvenile. These new charges were consolidated into the Superseding 
Indictment. On September 21, 2007, Britton pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 
for conspiracy to use interstate transportation with intent to engage in prostitution in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421; coercion and enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422; 
and interstate travel in aid of prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. He also pled 
guilty to sex trafficking of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 for the acts occurring 
in 2002.  
In Britton’s plea agreement, the Government agreed that “[u]pon completion of 
the cooperation, if the United States believes the defendant has provided ‘substantial 
assistance’ pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the United 
States may request the Court to depart below the guideline range.” Supp. App. (“S.A.”) 
157. At sentencing, the parties noted that Britton had begun cooperating with the 
Government in another case, but that his cooperation was “not complete.” S.A. 226. 
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Accordingly, the Government concluded that Britton had not provided sufficient 
assistance to warrant a presentence downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. 
However, the Government noted that a post-sentence departure under Rule 35(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for Britton’s substantial assistance could be 
forthcoming. S.A. 226-27. 
On January 21, 2009, the District Court sentenced Britton to 300 months’ 
imprisonment. Within a year of sentencing, after Britton testified against another 
individual, the Government filed a post-sentence motion for downward departure under 
Rule 35(b). The District Court granted the motion and reduced Britton’s sentence to 210 
months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the District Court applied the 2007 Sentencing 
Guidelines to all of the conspiracy counts. The 2007 Guidelines included a 2004 
amendment, resulting in a harsher penalty for Britton’s 2002 crimes, which had been 
incorporated into the conspiracy ending in 2005. Britton now appeals.
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II. 
On appeal, Britton contends that the District Court (1) erred by applying a four-
level enhancement for his role as “organizer or leader of a criminal activity”; (2) plainly 
erred in allowing the Government to defer a motion for a downward departure for 
presentence substantial assistance until after sentencing; and (3) erred by applying the 
2007 Sentencing Guidelines in violation of the ex post facto clause. We address each of 
Britton’s arguments in turn.   
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C § 1291.  
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A. 
Britton first argues that the District Court erred by assigning him a four-level 
enhancement for his role as an “organizer or leader” in the prostitution ring. “We review 
a District Court’s factual determinations underlying the application of the sentencing 
guidelines for clear error.” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 242-43 (3d Cir. 
2000). “[W]e exercise plenary review over legal questions involving the proper 
interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 243. “We may affirm 
the rulings of the District Court for any proper reason that appears on the record even 
where not relied on by it.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 337 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), a four-level enhancement is proper “[i]f the defendant 
was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or 
was otherwise extensive.” To qualify as “otherwise extensive,” a criminal scheme must 
involve “no less than the defendant and one participant the defendant led or organized.” 
Helbling, 209 F.3d at 248 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. n.2).
2
 “A ‘participant’ is a person 
who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been 
convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. n.1. Victims, including prostitutes, are often deemed 
“nonparticipants.” See id. (defining nonparticipants); U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 n.1 (defining 
victims). A victim “is considered a participant only if that victim assisted in the 
promoting of a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct in respect to another 
victim.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 n.3.  
                                              
2
 The test also requires qualifying “nonparticipants.” Both parties agree that the nine or 
more prostitutes under Britton’s control satisfy the “nonparticipants” prong.  
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The record reveals that Tana Adkins qualifies as a “participant” led or organized 
by Britton because she assisted in promoting prohibited sexual conduct with respect to 
other victims. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 n.3; United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1089 
(8th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1) (holding that a prostitute qualified as a 
“participant” because she “served as a trainer for [a] minor prostitute”). As a result of her 
role as Britton’s “bottom bitch,” Adkins pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in interstate 
prostitution. As a coconspirator, Adkins qualifies as a participant because she was 
“criminally responsible for the commission of the offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. 
n.1; United States v. Levine, 983 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that four 
individuals who had been recruited by the defendant-organizer and who pled guilty as 
codefendants were participants “sufficient to satisfy § 3B1.1”). Accordingly, the District 
Court did not err in applying a four-level sentence enhancement for Britton’s role as an 
organizer or leader in the prostitution ring. 
B. 
Britton next argues that the Government improperly deferred making a 
presentence motion for downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 until after 
sentencing. Because Britton did not previously raise this argument, we review for plain 
error. See United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009). “Plain 
error requires the defendant to demonstrate that the district court committed an error that 
is plain and that affect[s] substantial rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Government has “a power, not a duty, to file a [substantial-assistance] 
motion.” Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992). It abuses this power “only if 
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the refusal was based on bad faith, if a plea agreement otherwise required the government 
to consider offering a § 5K1.1 departure motion, or on an unconstitutional motive.” 
United States v. Holman, 168 F.3d 655, 661 (3d Cir. 1999). Section 5K1.1 permits a 
district court to grant a downward departure “[u]pon motion of the government stating 
that the defendant has provided substantial assistance.” U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. To determine 
the appropriate sentence reduction, the court considers several factors, including “the 
government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered” and “the timeliness of the 
defendant’s assistance.” Id. In addition, under Rule 35(b), the government may move for 
a downward departure “if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial 
assistance.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (emphasis added).  
Here, the Government’s decision to bring a post-sentence Rule 35(b) motion rather 
than a presentence § 5K1.1 motion was not improper. The Government did not defer 
bringing a § 5K1.1 motion; it expressly declined to make one given Britton’s incomplete 
presentence participation. At sentencing, counsel for both parties discussed the potential 
for future participation and a corresponding motion under Rule 35(b) after completion of 
Britton’s assistance. This complied with the plea agreement, which only gave rise to the 
Government’s obligation to move for downward departure “[u]pon completion of the 
cooperation.” S.A. 157; see also U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (listing factors including “the 
timeliness of the defendant’s assistance”). Moreover, to the extent Britton argues that his 
incomplete presentence assistance compelled the Government to bring, and the District 
Court to consider, a presentence departure motion under § 5K1.1, that argument must 
fail. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(3) (emphasizing that the court “may consider the 
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defendant’s presentence assistance” to determine whether a post-sentence departure is 
warranted). Thus, the Government was not obligated to bring a presentence § 5K1.1 
motion and the District Court did not plainly err by granting the Government’s post-
sentence Rule 35(b) motion.  
C. 
Finally, Britton argues that the District Court violated the ex post facto clause of 
the Constitution by applying the 2007 Sentencing Guidelines to his 2002 crimes. We 
exercise plenary review over legal interpretations of the Guidelines. United States v. 
Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011). The ex post facto clause generally precludes 
the application of a Guideline that retroactively increases the punishment for a 
defendant’s crimes. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013). The date of the 
last overt act in a conspiracy as a whole, rather than the last overt act by the defendant, is 
the controlling date for ex post facto clause purposes. United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 
1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Here, Britton’s 2002 crimes were incorporated into the conspiracy, which ended in 
2005. The District Court applied the 2007 Guidelines to all of the conspiracy counts 
because the Guidelines did not materially change between 2005 and 2007. The 2007 
Guidelines reflected a 2004 amendment that resulted in a harsher penalty when applied to 
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 “Under the substantive law of conspiracy in this Circuit, one who willfully enters an 
agreement to commit a crime remains a participant in the agreement unless and until he 
communicates or otherwise objectively manifests a decision to renounce the agreement.”  
Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1069 (citation omitted). Britton presents no evidence that he 
affirmatively renounced his participation before the conspiracy ended in 2005.  
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Britton’s 2002 crimes. Under Rosa, this did not violate the ex post facto clause because 
the last overt act in the conspiracy occurred in 2005, after the 2004 amendment. See 
Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1065. Thus, the District Court did not err in applying the 2007 
Guidelines.
4
  
III. 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
                                              
4
 We find no merit in Britton’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Peugh 
invalidates the application of Rosa. In Peugh, the Court held that, although the Guidelines 
are now advisory and not mandatory, the ex post facto clause still applies to a retroactive 
application of a harsher Guidelines range. 133 S. Ct. at 2084. Nothing in Peugh supports 
Britton’s counterintuitive argument that rules existing and constitutionally permissible 
when the Guidelines were mandatory violate the ex post facto clause because the 
Guidelines are now advisory. We will not hold so here. Nor will we revisit our sound 
precedent in Rosa.  
 
